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The Indigent Criminal Defendant and
Defense Services: A Search for
Constitutional Standards
By EPHRAIM MARGOLIN* and ALLEN WAGNER**
"The methods we employ in the enforcement of our crimi-
nal law have aptly been called the measures by which the
quality of our civilization may be judged."1
THIS article is written at that stage in our constitutional develop-
ment when the formal right of indigents to appointed counsel is
well established but when its practical content increasingly occupies
courts' attention. The article is limited to an examination of one
question: whether experts and investigators (hereinafter referred to as
"defense services") 2 must be made available to assist the defense as a
matter of right. The approach employed here is the same approach that
would have been used in examining the right to counsel itself before
Powell v. Alabama3 or Gideon v. Wainwright.
4
The article starts by reciting the facts of actual, unreported
cases. Next, it analyzes the theoretical justifications for defense
services. It continues with a classification of "needs" for such serv-
ices and, after viewing the largely porous reasoning underlying the
precedential law, concludes that (1) the right to legal services is a
* Adjunct Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of
the Law; member of the California and Federal bars.
** Member, Third Year Class, University of California, Hastings College of
the Law.
1. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962).
2. For a partial listing of such services see Oaks, Obtaining Compensation
and Defense Services Under the Federal Criminal Justice Act in 1 CRIMINAL DEFENSE
TtcmQuEs § 7.14 (R. Cipes ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Oaks]. See generally
ABA, PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
To PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES (1967).
3. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
4. 372 U.S. 355 (1963).
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constitutional right; that (2) the test of "equal access to justice"
means less than the words imply but more than most courts are will-
ing to provide; and that (3) a reasonable, workable test for mini-
mum assistance is available, and its application is constitutionally re-
quired regardless of whether there exist statutes on the subject and
regardless of whether counsel is appointed or nonappointed in the
case.
Defense Services in Actual Practice
Assume that you are the prospective counsel for a Mr. Barry,
who is accused of killing a woman whom he just met in a bar.' He
admits to the police that he met the woman and gave her a ride to
another location. He insists that he never saw her again. Her almost
nude body and a blood-soaked washcloth were found the following
noon on a snow covered hill. Upon examination by police experts,
the cloth proved to contain a variety of fibers, vegetation, and dog
hair, arguably traceable to the defendant's car. The police pathol-
ogist reported that the victim died of exsanguination (bleeding to
death) and exposure to cold. The time and place of death was es-
tablished on the basis of the physical and chemical condition of the
victim's remains. The area where the body was found showed drag
marks subject to varying interpretations. The body itself showed
marks initially, erroneously, described as burns and bites.
The defendant was questioned by the police approximately one
week after the body was discovered. He permitted the police to
search and examine his car, where they discovered several blood
drops along with fibers, dog hair and various kinds of vegetation. He
allowed the police to examine his body and photograph various
scratches and poison oak eruptions covering it. He gave the po-
lice a sworn statement which contained false information that he
never had been arrested before and, after giving them clothes which
he wrongly represented as the clothing he wore on the date of the
victim's demise, he departed from the state. Two and a half months
later he voluntarily surrended to the police, stating that the rea-
son for his flight was that as a parole violator from another state he
feared automatic reincarceration. At the time of his surrender the
district attorney was ready to prosecute him with the aid of almost
one hundred witnesses and two hundred fifty exhibits. The work of
the defense had not yet begun.
5. People v. Barry, No. 136128 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Mateo County, Sept. 11,
1968).
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The court found the defendant indigent and appointed coun-
sel to represent him. Subsequently, the court indicated concern
with the adequacy of the representation. At this point you are ap-
proached by an ad hoc defense committee requesting that you repre-
sent Mr. Barry as private counsel. A nominal amount of money
raised by public subscription is available as a retainer. Assume
that both defendant's indigency and your own willingness to serve at
a nominal fee are not in question." If you accept the case, how
would you prepare for the defense?
At the outset you will have to examine all the available evi-
dence for possible clues and interview all witnesses. The available
physical evidence and specific reports would require expert help in
interpreting their content and in determining whether expert testimony
will be required at trial. Prosecution witnesses will have to be inter-
viewed. Next, despite the time which has elapsed between the kill-
ing and your entry into the case, you will search for alibi witnesses.
Only after all this is done could the case be evaluated properly and
the client be advised about proposed strategy for his defense.
In the case of People v. Barry,7 counsel started his work on
the case by moving for appointment of an investigator, a criminalist
and a pathologist at public expense. He did so even though he
himself was a private nonappointed counsel. He argued that once
the indigency of the accused is established, the county in which the
defendant is tried actually saves money when nonappointed coun-
sel agrees to serve without fees or for reduced fees. He also ar-
gued that the need for defense services is the same, regardless of
whether appointed or nonappointed counsel represents the indigent
defendant. The court accepted these arguments in spite of unfav-
orable state law and local precedents8 by relying on constitutional
6. See Drumgo v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 647, 103 Cal. Rptr. 100
(1972), hearing granted, No. SF 22953 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Aug. 24, 1972). In Drumgo
the trial court refused to appoint for compensation the specific attorney requested by
the indigent defendant although the attorney expressed his willingness to serve. The
appellate court reversed on the ground of abuse of discretion. At present the case is
pending before the California Supreme Court.
7. No. 136128 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Mateo County, Sept. 11, 1968).
8. The significance of this is seen by a review of California law in the area
of court appointed experts. An expert may be appointed either under CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 987.2(a) (West 1972), or CAL. Evm. CoDE § 730 (West 1968). Under the former
statute the expert is solely for defense use but the attorney must be appointed by the
court. The statute is actually directed at compensating appointed counsel by providing
for "a reasonable sum for compensation and for necessary expenses . . ." But
"necessary expenses" has been interpreted to at times include expert fees, 41 O.Ps.
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requirements of fair trial, right to effective counsel and equal pro-
tection.
At trial the defense pathologist challenged the cause, place and
time of death. The defense criminalists and investigators (1) neu-
tralized police interpretation concerning fibers and blood on the
washcloth, (2) proved that the "blood stained" seatcovers in the
defendant's car were not stained with blood and, in any event, were
installed in the car three days after the killing, and (3) found and
examined a bloody knife (which was then returned to its original
place behind the cushion of defendant's car). By the time the
state criminalists discovered the knife, the defense investigator had
succeeded in locating the probable owner and the knife was shown
in court not to be the murder weapon. In the same case, defense
criminalists rebutted testimony concerning hair, cigarette butts, lipstick,
and several kinds of rare vegetation. After a twelve-week trial the
jury hung nine to three for conviction and a negotiated disposition
followed.
Barry is only one example of the practical implications of de-
fense services to the indigent and his attorney. When a criminal
lawyer enters the case he seldom is aware of the magnitude of in-
vestigatory and expert assistance that may be required. In an unre-
ported 1972 case, People v. Gutierrez,9 involving a charge of as-
sault with a deadly weapon (throat cutting) on defendant's com-
mon-law wife, the defense was that the victim had attempted sui-
cide. During discovery stages of the case the prosecution informed
the defense of its intention to call as witnesses hospital personnel
who actually treated the victim. In his opening statement, the dis-
trict attorney for the first time disclosed that he also would offer
testimony of the city coroner to show that the wound could not have
been self-inflicted.
Defense counsel, who served in the case as a retained attorney,
CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 151 (1963). Under the latter statute the expert is a court expert
subject to call by either party or the court. California law does not provide for the
appointment of defense experts where counsel is not appointed, but rather is retained
or volunteers his services. Appointment of experts under either statute is at the
discretion of the court. People v. Berry, 199 Cal. App. 2d 97, 18 Cal. Rptr. 388
(1962); People v. Gorg, 45 Cal. 2d 776, 291 P.2d 469 (1955). The appointed
counsel need only convince the court of the "need" for an expert; while the non-
appointed counsel must further convince the court that under its discretion and
without statutory authority the court should restrict the expert to defense assistance.
9. People v. Gutierrez, No. 84415 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Fran. County, Nov. 22,
1972).
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moved for appointment of a defense pathologist at the People's ex-
pense on the ground that at that point in time the defendant had ex-
hausted all his resources and was indigent. Counsel argued that
he was equipped to cross-examine treating physicians about their
ministrations to the victim, but had neither the skills to examine fo-
rensic experts nor funds to present a rebuttal expert of his own.
The court granted the motion as to one expert with an admonition
that if further appointments of experts were to be requested, the
court would rule on such motions only upon proper disclosure by the
counsel as to the amount of fees paid him in the case.10
If Barry illustrates the extremely complex case, Guiterrez ex-
emplifies the more common, one issue, one-week-long jury trial. In
both types of cases, courts adopt inconsistent approaches to the
problem of defense services.1" For example, in People v. Coates,
12
a 1970 unreported case, a cablecar gripman was prosecuted for crim-
inal negligence in operating a cablecar down a hill. His defense
was that the braking equipment was faulty. The court refused to
appoint a defense expert in mechanical engineering on the ground
that California statutes did not provide for appointment of experts
in cases where the counsel himself was nonappointed. Constitu-
tional arguments of counsel were rejected, but the defendant was ac-
quitted anyway.
With this short introduction concerning facts in three unre-
ported cases, the article now turns to an analysis of the available
arguments which elevate the granting of defense services by the
courts to the high level of a constitutional imperative.
The Seven Rationales for Providing
Defense Services
Most state courts require the defendant to show a particularized
10. Compare this ruling with the federal procedure outlined in Oaks, supra note
2, at § 7.13[21. Oaks argues that the defense services are available to both retained
and appointed counsel.
11. Compare State v. Second Judicial District Court, 85 Nev. 241, 453 P.2d 421
(1969) (constitutional rights of accused require reimbursement of expenses) and
People v. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966) (right to compulsory proc-
ess requires funding of expert witnesses), with State v. Superior Court, 2 Ariz. App.
458, 509 P.2d 742 (1966) (no constitutional mandate to supply "full paraphenalia
of defense"). For a thorough, although dated, state-by-state review see 2 & 3 L.
SiLvEmsTEiN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CaMMnArL CASES IN AiMPICAN STATE COURTS
(1965).
12. No. 26353 (Cal. Ct. App., 1st App. Div., Dec. 19, 1968).
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need or necessity for the requested defense services. 3 Webster de-
fines "necessary" as "[e]ssential to a desirable or projected end
"14 In other words, what is "necessary" can be decided only
after one answers the question: "Necessary to what end?" Court
discussions of defense services annunciate the following "ends":
(1) establishment of the defendant's innocence; (2) equality of ac-
cess to justice as between the poor and the rich; (3) equality of ac-
cess to justice as between the indigent defendant and the prosecu-
tion; (4) access to that which is fundamental for a "fair trial"; (5)
access to that which assures "adequate defense"; (6) access to that
which "assists counsel"; and, (7) access to that which assures an
"effective defense." These talismanic formulae neither exhaust the
subject nor explain it. Frequently they overlap; often they are used
interchangeably. However, on closer examination, they are more
than arbitrary variations in nomenclature; they represent diverse tradi-
tions in constitutional thought, evoke different philosophies of justice
and invite potentially inconsistent results.
Establishing Innocence
On at least one occasion, a court has construed the "end" of
establishing innocence as requiring that "[a] defendant's lack of
funds should not prevent him from obtaining evidence which might
establish his innocence."' 5  The verbal reach of this formula would
seem to require only a plausible relation between the services sought
and the expectation of success in unearthing some proof of innocence.
Naturally, the practical limits of this test, as in all other tests, depend
on how and by whom the plausible relations and the reasonableness of the
request are determined. If this test be limited only by rules of relevancy
and by a prohibition of cumulative testimony, it would have justified all
of the appointments in People v. Barry. Indeed, a broad reading of this
test-to authorize services where the evidence unearthed would not be
inadmissible-could have resulted in appointment of several additional
experts in that case.
Equality with the Rich
Equating of the poor with the rich requires an examination
13. E.g., State v. Taylor, 202 Kan. 202, 447 P.2d 806 (1968) (no statute per-
mitting appointment of experts); Commonwealth v. Phelan, 427 Pa. 265, 234 A.2d
540 (1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 920 (1968) (statute permitting appointment).
14. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTiONARY 1635 (2d ed. 1959).
15. State v. Green, 55 N.J. 13, 18, 258 A.2d 889, 891 (1969) (dictum) (empha-
sis added).
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of what the rich do or could do under similar circumstances. Yet,
what the rich could do frequently is not reasonable by an average
defendant's standards. The rich could shop for experts without seek-
ing court permission and use only those experts who are most re-
sponsive to any given theory. The rich could employ more expen-
sive experts and more of them. They could reach out of state for
the most qualified and articulate individuals to pursue even unlikely
leads. The test of "equality with the rich" could not and does not
contemplate "ideal equality."' 6
Indeed, some inequality is inherent in the very requirement that
an indigent defendant seek court approval of defense services by
articulating particularized needs for the court, an act not required
of the rich.1 7  Apart from this, there are legitimate limits imposed
by society on all seekers of communal largess, even as to rights
deemed "fundamental"-from criminal defense to education. The
courts are unlikely either to bring the poor to a truly equal footing
with the rich or, conversely, to equate the rich with the poor by more
stringent enforcement of limitations on cumulative proof attribut-
able to affluence. The latter solution is particularly untenable, since
evidence, once located, ought not to be suppressed. Once the rich
defendant uses his funds to good advantage, the results should not be
kept out. The conclusion, in the words of the Sixth Circuit constru-
ing the Federal Criminal Justice Act' is: "[T]he Congressional pur-
pose . . . was to seek to place indigent defendants as nearly as may
be on a level of equality with nonindigent defendants."' 9
Equality with the Prosecution
The test of equality with the prosecution is demonstrated most
dramatically in the notorious, political or highly visible cases such as
Sirhan, Manson or the Angela Davis case. In Davis,20 for example,
the state of California made available for the prosecution three full
time members of the state attorney general's staff, several deputy
district attorneys, services of the F.B.I., C.I.A. and district attorney's
investigating staff, the police, and unlimited resources for experts.
16. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (absolute equality is not
required); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956) (adequate and effective alterna-
tives to complete equality may be used).
17. Cf. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970).
19. United States v. Tate, 419 F.2d 131, 132 (6th Cir. 1969) (emphasis added).
20. People v. Davis, No. 52613 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Clara County, June 4,
1972).
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In addition, the California legislature enacted special legislation to
reimburse the trial county for all costs including those of appointed
counsel. 2 In their motion for appointment and costs, defendant's
nonappointed counsel argued that the issue was not "whether or not
the defendant is a pauper but whether she is overwhelmed by the
superior resources of the State . ,"2 Nonetheless, extreme cases
merely dramatize what is equally true but less dramatically repre-
sented in ordinary criminal trials. President Kennedy referred to such
equality in a more general sense, when he wrote:
In the typical criminal case the resources of government are pitted
against those of the individual. To guarantee a fair trial under such
circumstances requires that each accused person have ample oppor-
tunity to gather evidence, and prepare and present his cause.
2 3
In an adversary system, equal access to trial resources for both
adversaries is at the very roots of fair play.24  However, in this con-
text "equality" has many meanings. One could compare the re-
sources of the "average," hypothetical defendant with those of the
abstract "system"; one could compare the resources of a specific
defendant with those state resources which might reasonably be ex-
pected to be brought to bear on the specific case; or one could com-
pare the resources of a specific defendant with state resources which
in retrospect actually were committed in the case. Each formula
creates problems of its own. In comparing "a defendant" with
"the system," it must be remembered that there are cases where the
defense is better prepared than the prosecution, indeed, sometimes
better financed and backed by an array of more sophisticated legal
talent. On the other hand, there are cases where no cost and effort
is spared by the prosecution in total determination to win a convic-
tion. Not only "notorious" cases belong in this category; sometimes,
for reasons of personality conflict, ambition, local policy, or for no
apparent reason, a case of oral copulation or a case of obscenity or
a case of gambling will turn into a multiweek, multiwitness, multi-
expert "federal case."
21. CAL. PEN. CODE § 4700.2 (West 1972).
22. Motion to Appoint Experts at 5, People v. Davis, No. 52613 (Cal. Super.
Ct., Santa Clara County, June 4, 1972).
23. Letter from John F. Kennedy to the House of Representatives, March 8,
1963, 1964 United States Congressional and Administrative News 2993 (emphasis
added).
24. See Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration
of Justice in HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES, AN ANTHOLOGY OF INSPIRATIONAL AND OTHER
HELPFUL WRITINGS FOR MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY 122-23 (D. Carroll ed. 1961).
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Where all the facts in the case are fairly known before trial, it
is easier to predict the minima of equal access to defense resources
necessary to put the indigent defendant on a more equal footing with
the prosecution. A more difficult, an.dbmnpre:c _ t0,on, problem
arises where the prosecution itself does not -know or ill-not tell what
kind of case it has against the defendant.25 Even -where the, de-
fendant obtains the relatively infrequent order for continuing di -
covery against the prosecution, 26 new evidence may develop mi d-
trial, tactics may change or new witnesses may be brought in. In
a typical case, neither the court nor the defense (and often not the
prosecution itself) can predict what the prosecution will end up
doing before the trial is over. In many jurisdictions the very iden-
tity of the prosecutor may not be known until fairly close to the date
of trial. In many state courts the prosecution habitually "reviews"
the case only in time for pretrial conference.
Furthermore, in many cases both the police and the prosecu-
tion are either wilfully selective or negligent in the preparation and
presentation of the evidence. Frequently the district attorney re-
lies on the "totality of facts in the case"-the testimony of eyewit-
n6sses, confessions or circumstantial evidence at hand-while down-
grading the careful examination of physical evidence for possible
exculpatory clues.2 7  All practitioners of criminal law will recount
endless tales of prosecutorial reliance on eyewitnesses to the exclu-
sion of fingerprinting, blood and sperm typing, or even blood alco-
hol tests. In such cases, if scientific testing is still possible,28 it may
25. Generally, the results of the prosecutor's investigations -are not discoverable.
See Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 233-41, & -n.7,(1971) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing); Moore, Criminal Discovery, 19 HASTINGs L.J. 865 (1968). But see ca6cited
in notes 26 & 27 infra; People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223, 384 P.2d 16, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424
(1963) (balancing of interests to determine if discovery is to be allowed); People V.
Vick, 11 Cal. App. 3d 1058, 90 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1970) (state has no interest in
denying access to all evidence).
26. Cf. Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 61, 372 P.2d 919, 922, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 879, 882 (1962) (continuing discovery awarded to prosecution against the de-
fendants for names of witnesses). See generally Margolin, Toward Effective Crimi-
nal Discovery in California-A Practitioner's View, 56 CALiF. L. REv. 1040, 1054
(1968).
27. As a practical matter, once the unscrupulous prosecutor has accumulated
what he considers sufficient evidence for a conviction, he may be reluctant to con-
tinue his investigation since any exculpatory evidence found must be disclosed lest he
be subject to a charge of suppressing evidence. See, e.g., In re Ferguson, 5 Cal. 3d
525, 487 P.2d 1234, 96 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1971).
28. Such testing could become impossible with the passage of time since evi-
dence may disappear, e.g., fingerprints get smudged, blood dries and can no longer be
-typed by subgroups, etc.
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be the only chance for the defense to show innocence. 29  For the
prosecution, such testing may be no more than an exercise in foot-
noting what it considers to be self-evident.
Where the defense desires a scientific test, the rich simply buy
it. The poor must either obtain appropriate appointment of an ex-
pert or compel the prosecution to perform neglected tests. No de-
fense counsel generally will risk requesting a prosecution-conducted
test without foreknowledge of its result. Even in that rare case
where the defense is inclined to take such chances, courts seldom
would force a reluctant prosecutor to run tests "for the defense. 30
The theory is that the courts will not tell the prosecution how to run
its case. Nevertheless, the results for the defense are obvious: if
the prosecution is not ordered to run the test, the test may not be
made at all in the absence of funds. Furthermore, even if the
courts would order the prosecutor to perform such tests, can the ad-
versary system compel the indigent, but not the rich, defendant to
rely on his adversary's testing skills and procedures? 3 Even more im-
29. Failure to assist the defense in performing such tests may preclude a de-
fense. E.g., People v. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966). Watson
was a forgery case in which the prosecution did not perform a handwriting analysis.
The court held that to deny the defendant the services of a court-appointed expert
documents examiner might, under this circumstance, preclude a defense. Although the
court did not mandate action by the prosecutor, it did find the constitutional right to
summon defense witnesses sufficient for the appointment of an expert. Accord, State
v. Bowen, 104 Ariz. 138, 449 P.2d 603 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 912 (1969).
But here the court found no constitutional mandate to supply assistance to the de-
fendant in performing a sperm typology test even though it was an admittedly simple
test which might have exculpated him completely from the charge of rape.
30. See People v. Berry, 199 Cal. App. 2d 97, 18 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1962); People
v. Talman, 26 Cal. App. 348, 146 P. 1063 (1915). In both cases the court found no
duty upon a public official to assist the defendant in locating witnesses. But see
State v. Superior Court, 2 Ariz. App. 458, 463-64, 409 P.2d 742, 747-48 (1966) (dic-
tum) (prosecutor is duty bound to protect rights of the innocent).
31. Two problems may arise: conflict of interest, and variation in expert in-
terpretation. In Marshall v. United States, 423 F.2d 1315, 1319 (10th Cir. 1970), in
reviewing the court appointment of the F.B.I. to assist the defendant in investigation,
the court said: "[I]t seems apparent that only the most unusual circumstances could
relieve such a designation from the taint of plain error . . . . [Investigative aid
[given to the defendant must] serve him unfettered by an inescapable conflict of
interest. The Bureau ... is obviously faced with both a duty to the accused and
a duty to the public interest." In State v. Hancock, - Iowa -, 164 N.W.2d 330
(1969), the court found that a defendant charged with forgery was entitled to his own
handwriting expert, even though the prosecutor already had performed an evaluation,
based in part upon the recognition that handwriting analyses by experts vary. But
see In re Imbler, 60 Cal. 2d 554, 387 P.2d 6, 35 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1963), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 908 (1964), where in a habeas corpus attack, a showing that the prosecutor's
fingerprint expert was negligent and in error was not sufficient to overturn the verdict.
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portantly, what of the cases where the significance of physical evidence
has escaped the attention of the prosecution? May we legally require
the indigent, but not the rich, defendant to disclose anticipated results
to the prosecution as a precondition for the opportunity to examine the
evidence for such results?
One other alternative requires examination. In those cases
where the physical evidence escaped nobody's attention and where
both parties realize its potential importance, some courts tend to con-
sider it sufficient to appoint "impartial" witnesses selected by the
court, beholden to neither party and, in theory at least, neither
coached nor influenced by either.32  This alternative could still pro-
vide for "adversary" experts, but only in helping the parties to pre-
pare their cross-examination. In theory, this solution offers the ad-
vantage of eliminating the "battles of the experts. 33
Yet, perhaps "the battles of the experts" are neither unneces-
sary nor improper. The very fact that experts do disagree dem-
onstrates that an expert should not be presumed infallible merely
because he is selected by the court.34 In fact, experts, from psychia-
trists and pathologists to professors of criminalistics, remain quite
human behind the facade of their superior qualifications and much
in their testimony goes not to abstract factual findings but to findings
anchored in their philosophical predispositions, rooted in their
unconscious tendencies and sprouting a veritable forest of personal
mannerisms. For example, on the issue of diminished capacity or
prurient interest in obscenity cases, a psychiatrist must first deter-
mine whether the legal definition itself is meaningful and acceptable
to him. In areas of lesser moral or emotional involvement, an in-
terpretation of a wound could be rigid ("there is no doubt in my
mind that") or flexible ("it is likely that"). 3 The experience in
32. For example, on the issue of sanity, most jurisdictions require court ap-
pointed psychiatrists. E.g., CAL. PEN. COIYE § 1027 (West 1972). In other areas
court appointments may conflict with Fifth Amendment rights. See, e.g., United States
v. Brodson, 136 F. Supp. 158, 166 (E.D. Wis. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 241
F.2d 107 (7th Cir. 1957).
33. An alternative would be the use of stipulations. See, e.g., Oaks, supra note
2, at § 7.15(4).
34. Cf. United States v. Schappel, 445 F.2d 716, 720-21 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
35. In California v. Gutierrez, No. 84415 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Fran. County,
Nov. 11, 1972), the coroner testified "with 95% conviction" from a postsuture
photograph of the wound and without reference to any other facts, that the wound
could not have been self-inflicted but had to be assaultive. He based this opinion on
the absence of "hesitation marks" typical of suicidal wounds, and the curving angle of
the wound. The defense pathologist, equally adamant in his opinion, testified that
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People v. Barry36 illustrates genuine and honest disagreements on
substance even where the data is objectively measurable. For ex-
ample, in that case, two experts pointed to the same pathological
slide and to one it demonstrated tissue depleted of blood, while to
the other it clearly showed tissue satiated with blood. Where in-
complete or less than objective data confronts experts, disagreements
are bound to multiply.
Furthermore, the argument that the state has an interest in mini-
mizing the expenses of a criminal trial cannot overcome the obvious
fact that a criminal prosecution is an adversary proceeding. To deny
defense services to the indigent prevents the poor-but not the
wealthy-from becoming equal to the prosecution. If the financial
interest argument is valid, it seemingly should work both ways-
i.e., where the defendant has performed certain evidentiary tests, the
prosecutor should be precluded from expending state funds to repeat
the same tests, absent a showing that the defendant's experts were
biased. The obviously unacceptable result would be a race to per-
form the test first, and, furthermore, few if any prosecutors would be
willing to rely on the defendant's experts.
In sum, where there is physical evidence in a case, the perform-
ance or nonperformance of tests by the prosecution on that physical
evidence ought to be irrelevant to the right of the defense to examine
such evidence independently, just as the defendant's performance
of tests could not preclude the prosecutor from performing similar
tests. Where the prosecution's expert reports are available to the
defense, independent evaluation by the defense is equally justified.
The test is not what the prosecution actually did in any given case,
because this can never be reliably known ante factum; rather, one
starts with what is known about the prosecution's case and adds what
the prosecution reasonably could be expected to do.
Fairness
The test of fairness comes complete with historical barnacles. It
hestitation marks under the ear probably were obliterated in surgery; that a post-
operative photograph was an unreliable source of information on the subject; that the
breaks in the line of the wound indicated hestitation marks anyway; that the turn of
the head, the shallowness of the wound, the hospital records indicating admission of
an attempted suicide, the lack of outcry and the fact that the victim neither felt the
defendant nor saw him, although she was looking into a large mirror at the time. all
suggested a suicidal act. Any case which is susceptible of such polarity of forensic
evaluation simply cannot be tried fairly when only one view is suppressed.
36. No. 136128 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Mateo County, Sept. 11, 1968).
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reflects old norms of due process dating back to an era when "fair-
ness" was satisfied without any assistance of appointed counsel at
any stage of the criminal proceedings. For that reason, paradoxi-
cally, the test of fairness is the least "fair" among tests, falling con-
siderably short of the more recent formulae of equal protection.
37
Webster defines "fair" as a general term, "[which] implies,
negatively, the absence of injustice or fraud; positively, the putting of
all things on an equitable footing, without undue advantage to any
.... ,38 Thus, Webster describes "fairness" Janus-like, facing both
towards the language of due process and to equal protection. 39 His-
torically, however, the courts became fixated exclusively on the first
part of the definition: if the trial is not "unjust," it could not be
"unfair." Nonetheless, the second part of the definition is equally
vital and constitutes a natural bridge from the historicity of due
process to the latter day strictures of equal protection. "Without
undue advantage to any" commands a clear, simple, workable test
of treatment in lieu of the fuzzy tautology that the "process" meted
out to a defendant was "due," because neither "fraudulent" nor "un-
just." The very term "justice" thus comes for a redefinition: could
that be just which unduly advantages one party over the other?
The traditional test of fairness has been the most subjective of
tests. On occasion the appellate courts have compounded arbitrary
decisions of the lower courts with their own measure of arbitrari-
ness. Thus, for example, "fairness representation" could be found where
counsel showed diligence in the areas of law and motion, arguing
that appointed counsel who knew enough law to churn motions must
have also known enough to represent his client competently. Courts
habitually peruse the record for "un-fairness," although such unfairness
inherently lies outside the record, which could not reflect evidence
counsel did not find due to lack of experts or investigators.
Returning to Webster's definition, the question could also be
propounded in terms of unfairness to the prosecution. Could it be
argued that the prosecution is prejudiced when its pathologist is de-
throned from his position of exclusiveness and the defense is al-
lowed to challenge his opinions? Surely, challenges by the defense
only would be "putting all things on an equal footing, without undue
37. See, e.g., Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477
(1963); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1955).
38. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNAToNAL DICnONARY 910 (2d ed. 1959).
39. Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1955).
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advantage to any." Furthermore, if the prosecution is not pre-
judiced thereby, should the argument be allowed that the taxpayers,
as opposed to society at large, might prefer a cheaper brand of
"justice"?
Assistance to Counsel and Adequate Defense
The test of that which "merely assists counsel" arose out of ju-
dicial comments on the Criminal Justice Act. For example:
The rule in allowing defense services is that the Judge need only
be satisfied that they reasonably appear to be necessary to assist
counsel in their preparation, not that the defense would be defective
without such testimony. 40
This test, and the test of "adequate defense, "41 are variations on the
theme of "fairness." Semantically, they are quite elastic. Unquali-
fied "assistance to counsel" could mean "some' assistance, "mean-
ingful" assistance, or assistance which is "fair," "adequate" or "ef-
fective." "Adequacy" as a test brings to mind the old joke of "How
is your wife? As compared to what?" The federal courts, how-
ever, tend to construe broadly both the assistance to counsel and ad-
equate defense tests as authorizing that experts be made available,
both to testify, as well as to aid in pretrial preparation.4 2  History,
again, explains the result. Statutory construction of the Criminal Justice
Act is less hampered by long standing constitutional strictures of the
due process clause.
Effective Defense
Finally, no discussion of right to counsel cases could be com-
plete without a look at the line of precedents under the Sixth Amend-
ment's right to counsel.43 "Effective counsel," first mentioned in
40. United States v. Pope, 251 F. Supp. 234, 241 (D. Neb. 1966) (emphasis
in original).
41. The "adequate defense" test is also a derivation of the Criminal Justice
Act of 1964. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970). In United States v. Theriault, 440 F.2d
713, 715 (5th Cir. 1971), the court said: "The [Criminal Justice Act] expert ...
supplies expert services 'necessary to an adequate defense,' which embraces pretrial
and trial assistance to the defense as well as availability to testify."
42. 440 F.2d at 715.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, provides in part, "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his de-
fense." To satisfy this mandate in the federal courts there exists FED. R. CluM. P. 44.
A line of Supreme Court decisions, starting with Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932), through Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and culminating in
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), apply this same mandate to the states.
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Powell v. Alabama,44 has been construed by the California Supreme
Court to include "the aid and advice of experts whom counsel deems
useful to the defense .... -41 Effectiveness of counsel is increas-
ingly under scrutiny. Counsel clearly is ineffective if he cannot
cross-examine and raise proper objections.46 Yet, to be effective
counsel must also "investigate carefully all defenses of fact and of
law that may be available . . . . , This includes not only legal re-
search; it also requires a search for evidence, investigation of wit-
nesses48 and facts, interpretation of facts, and presentation of facts.
In cases of diminished capacity, for example, counsel cannot
be effective without psychiatric evaluation of the defendant, and with-
out the advice and testimony of the psychiatrist. In alibi cases,
neglecting to find, interview and produce the witnesses renders
the value of counsel's role questionable. In forgery cases, a hand-
writing expert is required49 in the absence of a confession which
satisfies defense counsel that his only role in the case is that of trying
to mitigate the penalty. In rape cases, sperm typology and sperm
count may be exculpatory. If exploration of facts is within the re-
quired duty of defense counsel, expert assistance to counsel in such
exploration becomes an inescapable corollary of the right of a de-
fendant to defend himself in propria persona. As one commentator
wrote:
The story of the indigent defendant who, upon being offered
counsel by the court, replied "If it's all the same to you, Judge, I'd
rather have a couple of good witnesses," summarizes what defense
44. 287 U.s. at 71.
45. In re Ketchell, 68 Cal. 2d 397, 399, 438 P.2d 625, 627, 66 Cal. Rptr. 881,
883 (1968).
46. In State v. Hancock, - Iowa -, 164 N.W.2d 330 (1969), the court
justified a defense expert in part on the basis of defense counsel's need in cross-
examining the state's handwriting expert.
47. People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 464, 386 P.2d 487, 490, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863,
866 (1963).
48. Some courts require counsel to do their own investigation. But counsel is
not trained as an investigator. A. AMSTEDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, TRIAL
MANuAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CAsEs-I 2-87 to 2-88 (2d ed. 1971).
If counsel attempts to impeach a witness he interviewed, he risks violating ethical
standards. ABA, PROJECT ON SrAN A Ds FOR CRIMINAL JusTicE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO THE PROsECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FuNCToN 231 (1970). He also
risks personal sanctions, Jackson v. United States, 297 F.2d 195, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1961)
(Burger, J., concurring), and a possible need to withdraw from the case midtrial.
Id.; Fish v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 761, 160 S.E.2d 576 (1968).
49. People v. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966); State v. Hancock,
- Iowa -, 164 N.W.2d 330 (1969). But cf. People v. Porter, 99 Cal. App. 2d 506,
222 P.2d 151 (1950).
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counsel will quickly learn-most cases turn on presentation of
evidence and not on legal argument.50
In short, the right to defense services is a defendant's right to
equality of treatment. Logically, this right is established by virtue
of poverty, regardless of whether counsel is assigned. The same logic
requires that the right to defense services extend to some cases where
the defendant is not indigent, but where prosecution resources are so
overwhelming as to invest the prosecution with undue advantage.
This logic, transcending precedents and statutes, turns directly to
the constitution for its authority.
Procedures for Demonstration of the Need
A careful examination of state and federal legislation and re-
ported cases suggests that throughout the United States a defendant
is required to demonstrate a "particularized need" in order to obtain
defense services." Before examining further the concept of "needs"
and their classification, it is necessary to digress to resolve a proced-
ural problem in demonstrating such needs to the court. The statu-
tory federal procedure calls for an ex parte showing of need in
camera, in the absence of the prosecution. 2  A transcript of the pro-
ceedings is prepared and sealed. Since a showing of need requires
disclosure of defense theory or, at least, of defense tactics, there
could be no justification for such disclosure becoming an automatic
discovery device for the prosecution solely because of the defend-
ant's indigency. Where rich defendants need disclose nothing to the
prosecution except possibly that a motion to inspect has been filed,
the indigent is required to particularize what his inspection is ex-
pected to show. The implications of equal protection are so strong
in this situation that even in the absence of legislation, state courts
should grant an in camera hearing upon request. When such a hearing
is granted, the procedure is to file a motion for defense services tendering
both the nature of the services sought and the reasons for seeking them
in a subsequent proceeding in camera. If the motion is granted, court
records will reflect a one-line entry that the motion was granted, and
separate orders, naming the experts, their compensation and their ex-
50. A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE
OF CRIMINAL CASEs-Il 2-85 (2d ed. 1971).
51. E.g., Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) & (2) (1970); cases
cited note 13 supra.
52. Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) (1970); Marshall v.
United States, 423 F.2d 1315 (10th Cir. 1970). See generally Oaks, supra note 2.
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pected function, are signed but not filed until the verdict is entered in the
case.
Classification of Needs
Threshhold Problems in Identification of the Need
The earlier discussion of People v. Barry noted that before ap-
plying to the court for appointment of experts, counsel must first satisfy
himself that the need for expert testimony exists. This alone fre-
quently requires expert advice. When counsel is shown a pathology
report, a post-mortem photograph and a drawer full of autopsy speci-
mens and slides, unless he himself is trained in pathology, he will be
unlikely to spot possible errors of interpretation or description, the
omission of relevant data and procedures, or indeed, the very signifi-
cance-both medical and forensic-of what he is shown. Similar
problems confront counsel in cases involving plant identification, hand-
writing, blood typology, identification of drugs or fingerprints.
Reported cases where defense services are denied for failure to
show a particularized need uniformly assume that the need itself was
readily identifiable to counsel. 53  However, as suggested above, this
seldom is true. To determine the need for expert examination in any
nonlegal field, defense counsel must rely on expert advice which, in some
cases, would result in corroborating the findings of the coroner,
in other cases it would raise doubts and provide counsel with a mean-
ingful cross-examination, and in a small number of cases it would
establish the "need" for further expert testimony. In other words,
where expertise is required not to prove a point but merely to check
whether the point exists, the defendant should not be required to dem-
onstrate the same type of need which he is required to show in order
to have an appointed expert fully investigate and prepare to testify
in court. There are at least two levels of "need":54 a threshhold level
53. E.g., Christian v. United States, 398 F.2d 517, 519 (10th Cir. 1968). The
court held: "When counsel requests court authority for the employment of an in-
vestigator or experts, he should point out with specificity the reasons such services
are necessary." In People v. Berry, 199 Cal. App. 2d 97, 105, 18 Cal. Rptr. 388, 392
(1962), in passing on a request for an expert, the court noted that, "No proposed
expert was named, nor was there any statement of any preliminary interview with an
expert . . . ." In Dolan v. People, 168 Colo. 19, 36, 449 P.2d 828, 836 (1969), the
court required a showing of "prejudice or possible prejudice . . .upon a failure to
appoint." In State v. Geelan, 80 S.D. 135, 138, 120 N.W.2d 533, 535 (1963), the
court noted: "Defendant's application did not intimate any reason why an expert
witness should be appointed or that any were available or had been consulted by him
or anyone on his behalf."
54. This two-tier classification will aid in eliminating the fear of "fishing ex-
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which involves nominal funding and ought to be available as a matter
of course, solely upon a showing of indigency and the existence of
physical evidence or investigative need, or both;s5 and the less frequent
situation where the expert is needed to fully investigate and prepare
to testify, where "particularized need" should be demonstrated before
serious expenditures of funds are incurred.
This procedure is neither revolutionary nor even new. Under
the Federal Criminal Justice Act, appointed counsel is permitted re-
imbursable expenses of up to $150.00 without prior application but
subject to subsequent review. 6 Although the figure of $150.00 is not
sacrosanct, it could serve as a guideline for threshhold expenditures.
The new elements in the present proposal are to do away with the dis-
tinction between "appointed" and "nonappointed" counsel for pur-
poses of availability of defense services at public expense and to apply
threshhold funding to the states.
Thus the threshhold fund would assist in determining if the "need"
exists and would assist the defense in demonstrating that need. Be-
yond this problem of demonstrating a need lies the greater question of
whether some needs should be presumed by the very nature of the
crime charged and the type of evidence which exists.
Presumed Needs
A presumed need is defined here as one implied from the exist-
ence of certain actually or potentially relevant physical evidence.1
The nature of certain types of evidence creates a right to the services
of experts as a logical corollary. The test of presumed need covers,
inter alia, a handwriting expert in a forgery charge, a pathologist in a
murder case, a chemist where blood analysis is involved, a psychiatrist
where diminished capacity or insanity are at issue. For purposes of
peditions" that some courts have expressed. E.g., United States v. Schultz, 431 F.2d
907, 911 (8th Cir. 1970).
55. Cf. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (requirement that
indigents make a preliminary showing of merit to obtain an appeal is discriminatory);
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962) (a requirement of "good faith"
is to be judged by an objective standard which is satisfied if the issue raised is not
frivolous); Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 (1958) (a mere request for counsel
and appeal, unless frivolous, is sufficient for the appointment of counsel).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(2) (1970).
57. It is not suggested that the "right" to satisfy presumed needs should be
automatic. It is suggested that no such "right" exists until a request is made by the
defense. But once the request is made, judicial discretion should be minimized in
order to protect the defense from the subjectivity of those for whom even the right to
court appointed counsel borders on coddling of criminals and superfluous extravaganza.
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presumed need-i.e., a need which is assumed without a particularized
showing by the defendant-one expert per discipline ought to be ap-
pointed upon the defendant's request regardless of whether the prose-
cution employs experts of its own. Where the prosecution uses more
than one expert, the defense presumptively ought to be entitled to a
similar number of experts.
Although some courts deny expert assistance for the defense on the
grounds of an absence of statutory authority5 s and others hold that the
"totality of facts and circumstances" in each case ought to control
the outcome, 59 some courts already have recognized presumed needs. 60
Experience with criminal practice yields a list of minimum needs
which ought to be presumptively granted as a matter of course, on the
basis of ex parte affidavits, subject only to court supervision over the fact
of defendant's indigency and the proposed expert's fee schedule.
Where the alleged need is not one that should be presumed, the
decision of whether to grant defense services must be made on a case
by case basis. In such instances, since the defense would be able to
utilize the threshhold fund, it should carry the burden-at least un-
til more cogent criteria are developed-to show ex parte the basis
and reasonableness of the request for defense services and the facts
sought to be discovered or proved.
The Uncharted Areas of Other "Needs"
The dimensions of the uncharted areas of needs are seldom ex-
plored. Several examples come to mind. For example, your client is
charged with acts of oral copulation with two minors who claim that the
acts took place in your client's apartment. Your client has a prior con-
viction for contributing to the delinquency of minors. The two boys
are "male prostitutes"; they are neither above having enticed your cli-
58. E.g., State v. Superior Court, 2 Ariz. App. 458, 409 P.2d 742 (1966).
Contra, State v. Taylor, 202 Kan. 202, 447 P.2d 806 (1968) (absent a statute, the
inherent power of a court is sufficient to grant defense assistance); cf. Knox County
Council v. State, 217 Ind. 493, 29 N.E.2d 405 (1940) (judiciary is equal to legislature
with power to perform); Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13 (1854) (unconstitutional tax upon
attorneys to require performance without compensation).
59. E.g., State v. Geelan, 80 S.D. 135, 120 N.W.2d 533 (1963) (statutory
provision does not create absolute right to expert witnesses); State v. Taylor, 202
Kan. 202, 447 P.2d 806 (1968) (absent a statute, right to court appointed assistance
depends upon facts and circumstances of each case).
60. E.g., People v. Watson, 36 ll. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966) (document
examiner in forgery charge); State v. Hancock, - Iowa -, 164 N.W.2d 330 (1969);
State v. Green, 55 N.J. 13, 258 A.2d 889 (1969). See Britt v. North Carolina, 404
U.S. 226, 228 (1971) ("assumed" need of trial transcript in retrial is recognized).
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ent into his predicament nor, indeed, above blackmail or lying about
acts which did not happen. While your client is in jail, unable to post
bail, and the boys are in juvenile hall, you wish to bring fingerprint
experts into your client's apartment to prove that no fingerprints of ei-
ther boy will be found anywhere on the premises. "Proof of the neg-
ative" by lack of fingerprints is difficult at best, especially when some
period of time has elapsed since the arrest. Could you successfully
ask for appointment of a fingerprint expert? Must you ask for a
court-appointed expert, in which case the results will be revealed auto-
matically to all parties for better or for worse, or would you ask for an
appointment "to aid the defense," so that if prints are found you will
not be convicting your own client with your diligence and zeal? 6'
Another example is that your client is charged with possession for
sale of a large quantity of LSD and some marijuana after your client's
friend had brought a "friend" (an informer who was anything but a
friend) to your client's home. The "friend's" testimony purported to
justify the search of the premises by implicating your client in an
oral admission upon entry into the front room. It proceeds to describe
visual observation by the informer of loose marijuana on a table three
feet away and a "brick-like" object in a paper bag in the corner of the
living room and relates a conversation between your client and an un-
known person in the kitchen, purportedly overheard by the informer
while still in the living room. Your client denies any knowledge of the
loose marijuana and the "brick," denies conversations and especially dis-
claims knowledge of the 20,000 LSD pills found after his arrest in his
own bedroom, off the kitchen.
On the motion to suppress you produce an accoustics engineer
to reproduce the conditions as they were on the date of arrest in order
61. Consider the tactical advantage to the defense in the demand itself, as in
People v. Brown, No. 78406 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Fran. County, April 20, 1970),
where defendants were charged with receiving stolen property. Two days before the
arrest they brought into a junkyard nearly three tons of brass for sale and sold it
openly for $1400. The brass was peculiarly shaped in long strips. It subsequently
was identified as part of a $150,000 brewing machine, stripped from it during a theft
in a warehouse within one month preceding the arrest. The defense made an immedi-
ate written demand on the owners of the machine, the police and the district attorney
to permit fingerprinting of the machine. The police and the owners ignored the re-
quest. The district attorney opposed it successfully on the ground that defendants
were not charged with theft. Fingerprint evidence was irrelevant to the prosecution;
it was defense's only chance to corroborate their version of receiving the goods. As a
result of the frustrated demand to fingerprint the machine, the case against Sexton
was dismissed and Brown was allowed to plead to a misdemeanor which resulted in
neither a fine nor confinement in the county jail. This case illustrates a defense
technique of using the very demand for expertise to achieve a satisfactory disposition.
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to prove that it would have been physically impossible to overhear the
alleged conversation. You produce several witnesses to testify that at
the time in question the living room was so dark that one could not
tell whether he held in his hand a copy of Newsweek or a copy of Time
magazine, let alone identify "the leaves of grass." But your wit-
nesses are both unconventionally dressed and equipped with uncon-
ventional haircuts. You fear that the judge may be inclined to believe
the police informer. Could you show sufficient cause to justify the ap-
pointment of the engineer? Since the engineer will conduct the ex-
periment in the living room, could you also obtain an appointment of
another expert whose job it will be to supervise the other end of the
experiment in the kitchen? Should it make any difference to the out-
come of your motion whether you were an appointed counsel or a vol-
unteer counsel for the defendant?62
In a final example, you represent an "adult theatre" whose low-
est man on the totem pole, the ticket taker, was just arrested for his
part in exhibiting an obscene film. From past experience you know
that at trial the prosecution will call to the stand police "experts" on
community standards. You know that police officers were assigned
to make such a personal "study" of local standards and you know
from fellow attorneys that, incongruously, most courts allow these
"experts" to testify. In the absence of a strong rebuttal, such testimony
could tip the case against your client. Clearly, you would like to have
an expert of your own to rebut the police experts. You know that an-
other local attorney who represents more and richer clients than you
represent in that field has chartered a highly respected, statewide poll,
for a reputed sum of $10,000.00, to conduct a serious study of "com-
munity standards" under objective auspices and under statistically
valid conditions. You know that every case in which the $10,000.00
62. In the actual case, People v. Chaney, No. 80477 (Cal. Super. Ct., San
Fran. County, Oct. 20, 1971), the engineer testified without appointment and the
motion to suppress was continued to another date. Counsel advised the court that
defense funds would run out after the next court appearance and requested a date
certain. He cleared it with the court on the eve of the second day of hearing but,
upon arriving in court with the second expert, he found that a jury trial was assigned to
that department. He then asked his expert whether he would agree to waive fees.
The expert refused. Counsel then moved for a hearing in camera to appoint the ex-
pert. He filed an affidavit of the defendant's indigency, an affidavit of the public
defender that if appointed to replace counsel he would file the same motion to ap-
point the same expert, and his own waiver of demand for fees. The offer of proof
was heard in chambers. The motion was denied on the ground that the second expert
was merely a witness, not an expert witness, thereby providing the defense with a
major appellate issue and the 20,000 LSD pills were suppressed anyway.
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poll was used resulted in a defense verdict or in a hung jury. Your
client can afford attorneys' fees and costs of $1500.00. Assuming
that you cannot force the "rich" attorney to share his study with you,
what do you do? What motions do you frame? What will you decide
as a judge when the motions land on your desk?6"
These examples could be multiplied ad infinitum. Legal norms
do not operate in a social vacuum. Clearly, at some point judicial
discretion64 will be invoked against the defense. This article argues
only for the modest assertion that the lines be drawn at a different
minimum level than some reported cases require. 65 Beyond the new
threshhold of constitutional minima, there will be a vast area of
unexplored case-by-case issues ranging from the case of obvious need
to the extreme position, perhaps best exemplified by the sedition in-
dictment in United States v. Powell,"6 where defense counsel requested
63. These facts were taken from an "Evidentiary Hearing on a Demurrer" in
People v. Hubach, No. H-1431 (San Fran., Cal., Mun. Ct., Oct. 31, 1972).
64. Epithets on judicial discretion abound in legal literature. The fear or arbi-
trariness is best reflected by Lord Camden's remarks quoted in State v. Cummings,
36 Mo. 263, 278-79 (1865): "[T]he discretion of a judge is the law of tyrants; it is
always unknown; it is different in different men; it is casual and depends upon con-
stitution, temper and passion. In the best it is often caprice; in the worst, it is every
vice, folly and passion to which human nature can be liable." Mr. Justice Marshall
expressed the viewpoint that discretion must be strictly subject to the law, with little or
no latitude, in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866
(1824), when he wrote: "Judicial power, as contradistinguished from the power of
the laws, has no existence. Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will
nothing." Judicial discretion has had an entire spectrum of descriptions attached to
it; perhaps the best is the reasonable assimilation offered in Hubbard v. Hubbard,
77 Vt. 73, 77-79, 58 A. 969, 970 (1940): "All agree that by judicial discretion is
never intended the whim or caprice of the magistrate, nor a course of judicial action
inconsistent with itself. . . . [T]he judge should have in mind, first, a rule or stand-
ard, and second, the facts which are to be tested thereby. . . . [Where no prior
rule exists, the judge] is not altogether a law unto himself . . . . All judicial dis-
cretion may thus be considered as exercisable only within the bounds of reason and
justice . . . [It] is most usually found in matters of procedure and the conduct of
trials . . . where the situation itself is not easily reproduced in its original character,
and cannot safely be reviewed."
65. The argument, of course, is the obvious one that certain rights should be
transposed from the objective or procedural law to the substantive law. As pointed
out in Isaacs, The Limits of Judicial Discretion, 32 YALE L.J. 339, 346-47 (1923):
"All that can be said of . . . judicial discretion . . . is that there are fields in which
it is eminently desirable to have certain substantive rights clearly and easily predicated
and that as to these particular substantive rights as little leeway as possible should be
given to the courts." A further argument is drawn from the fact that in the area of
defense services the defendant could not demonstrate prejudice without producing the
very showing for which the assistance was denied.
66. No. 35065 (N.D. Cal., May 2, 1961).
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funds to bring one thousand witnesses from Communist China.
67
A Quick Look at the Precedents
In the introduction to this article, it was proposed that the sub-
ject of defense services be examined by using the same approach one
would have employed in examining the constitutional right to counsel
before Powell v. Alabama."' Even though it is submitted that the
comparative lack of favorable precedents in the field and the endless
roll of adverse precedents are not controlling, they are reviewed briefly
here in order to show why they are not controlling.
United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi6 9 is the only case in which the
Supreme Court has specifically treated the question of pretrial indigent
defense services. The 1953 Court rejected the contention that pre-
trial denial of psychiatric assistance to the defense amounted to a de-
nial of adequate counsel. In dictum the Court stated, "We cannot
say that the State has that duty by constitutional mandate. ' 70  Never-
theless, the facts of the case show that at least three pychiatrists did
testify at the trial-two as defense witnesses and one at the court's re-
quest.71 In addition, the record contained a serious question whether in
fact the defense ever requested the extra assistance.72 Qualifying
its holding, the Court stated, "As we have shown, the issue of the pe-
titioner's sanity was heard by the trial court. Psychiatrists testified.
That suffices.
'73
In Baldi, the Court favorably cited the First Circuit 1951 deci-
sion of McGarty v. O'Brien.74  McGarty rejected the contention that the
state is required to furnish the defense with its own psychiatrists when
two impartial psychiatrists already had been appointed as court wit-
nesses. 75  Absent a challenge of impartiality, the state was found un-
67. Id. Appointed counsel for Powell was given public funds to go to China
and to interview witnesses. However, the court did not authorize funds to bring the
witnesses to California at public expense. The case ultimately was dismissed by the
United States Attorney.
68. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
69. 344 U.S. 561 (1953).




74. 188 F.2d 151 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 928, rehearing denied,
341 U.S. 957 (1951).
75. Id. at 155: 'This is not a case where the state has refused to provide an
impartial psychiatric examination of the accused . . . . Quite the contrary . . . the
state has, at public expense. . . . The doctors designated by the Department of
Mental Health. .. are not partisan of the prosecution. . ....
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der no obligation to finance a battle of psychiatric experts. 76 How-
ever, the McGarty court left unanswered, indeed did not ask the ques-
tion, of how a challenge to court or prosecution psychiatrists could have
been made without a psychiatrist aiding the defense counsel in formu-
lating the challenge. McGarty, then, is not truly determinative even
as to the issue of adequacy of impartial, court-appointed witnesses that
go unchallenged, since the reason for the defendant's failure to chal-
lenge was neither briefed nor considered. Beyond this, both Baldi
and McGarty, two decades old, were decided solely on the basis of due
process of law77 and preceded the development of the right to counsel
and of the equal protection clause in indigent criminal proceedings.78
Mayer v. City of Chicago79 and Britt v. North Carolina,"0 both
1971 Supreme Court decisions, foreshadow the development of the in-
digent defendant's pretrial right to defense services under the equal pro-
tection clause, leading to the probable interment of Baldi. In Mayer,
the Court held that state-paid transcripts must be afforded indigent de-
fendants who need them for purposes of appeal, regardless of whether
the offense is a felony.81 This right apparently obtains even in the
76. Id. at 157: "Appellant's contention comes to this, that the state has the
constitutional obligation to promote such a battle of experts . . . . We do not think
that this is so .. . where there has been no challenge of the professional standing
and competence . . . and no question . .. raised as to their complete impartiality
77. In Baldi even the dissent by Justice Frankfurter was based on a due
process argument: "A denial of adequate opportunity to sustain the plea of insan-
ity is a denial of the safeguard of due process in its historical procedural sense which is
within the incontrovertible scope of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." 344 U.S. at 571. The Third Circuit, from whence Baldi was appealed, also
based its decision on due process: "We do not think the requirements of due process
go so far." United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540, 547 (3d Cir. 1951).
In McGarty, the First Circuit held: "[E]xamination and report by two competent
and impartial experts supplied at state expense is enough, we think, to satisfy the
state's constitutional obligation under the due process clause." 188 F.2d at 157. Note
that the First Circuit did recognize the disparity between the indigent and the rich but
confined its inquiry to whether due process was violated: "Obviously enough, an in-
digent defendant with assigned counsel may be at a disadvantage as compared with a
wealthy defendant having unlimited means for the hiring of investigators, of various
sorts of expert witnesses, of a battery of lawyers . . . . How far the state, having the
obligation to afford to the accused a fair trial, a fair opportunity to make his de-
fense, is required under the due process clause to minimize this disadvantage is a
matter which, in other contexts, may deserve serious examination." 188 F.2d at 155.
78. See, e.g., Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971); Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
79. 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
80. 404 U.S. 226 (1971).
81. 404 U.S. at 195-96.
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absence of assignment of counsel."' In Britt, the Court denied defend-
ant's claim to a mistrial transcript, but only after carefully limiting its
holding to the facts of that case and recognizing the "assumed" need
of such a "toor' at retrial.8 3 Justice Douglas, dissenting as to the result
in Britt, went beyond the transcript question and pointed out the vast
inequity between the prosecution and the defense in the area of "mar-
shalling of evidence. '84  The combined effect of these cases suggests
that "the indigent defendant seems to be entitled to everything that
the common experience of lawyers and judges indicates that the de-
fendant of more than moderate means would buy in a serious crimi-
nal matter."
85
Even under the old due process test there is a cogent argument
for state-paid defense services. This argument is implicit in the earlier
right to counsel decisions.8 ' In denying appointment of counsel in the
"noncritical" stages,87 the Court reasoned that through cross-examina-
tion and use of his own experts, the defendant is sufficiently pro-
tected when the evidence is of a physical or scientific nature.88  Such
reasoning is, of course, sound if, and only if, the defendant is suffi-
82. Compare Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to counsel where
incarceration is imposed), with Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1972) (right
to transcript even where only a fine is imposed).
83. 404 U.S. at 228: "[Elven in the absence of specific allegations it can ordi-
narily be assumed that a transcript of a prior mistrial would be valuable to the de-
fendant in at least two ways: As a discovery device in preparation for trial, and as a
tool at the trial itself for the impeachment of prosecution witnesses." The two-
pronged test used by the court in Britt-(1) the value for the purpose sought, and
(2) the availability of alternatives-seems equally applicable to other pretrial assist-
ance. Id. at 227.
84. Id. at 235-39 & n.7.
85. 2 BNA Cram. LAW REP. 2494 (Aug. 30, 1972).
86. The right to counsel has been extended and attaches to the defendant at all
pretrial "critical stages," including any custodial interrogations, Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966); or confrontations such as postindictment line-ups, United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
87. E.g., Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (taking of handwriting ex-
emplars is not "critical stage"). But see dissent by Justice Black. Id. at 279.
88. Id. at 267. For example, in Gilbert the taking of handwriting exemplars was
not a critical stage because: "If, for some reason, an unrepresentative exemplar is
taken, this can be brought out and corrected through the adversary process at trial
since the accused can make an unlimited number of additional exemplars for analysis
and comparison by government and defense handwriting experts. Thus, 'the accused
has the opportunity for a meaningful confrontation of the [State's] case at trial
through the ordinary process of cross-examination of the [State's] expert [handwrit-
ing] witnesses and the presentation of the evidence of his own [handwriting] experts."'
Id. at 267 (inserts by Court) quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-28
(1967).
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ciently aware of scientific issues that he is able to cross-examine effec-
tively and he has access to his own experts for rebuttal. For treatment
of the indigent, then, to meet due process requirements, the state
would need to supply experts or counsel, or both, at such physical ex-
aminations. Counsel alone, however, would be of doubtful utility if
he lacks training in the technical methodology of scientific investiga-
tion.
Baldi does not support, and could not support, the extravagant
contention that there is no constitutional obligation to supply defense
services, but post-Baidi circuit court decisions reflect conflicting phil-
osophies, most frequently couched in terms of "fundamental fairness."89
Those circuits which construe Baldi as denying the right to state-pro-
vided defense services as a constitutional requisite for indigents are
well represented by the Tenth Circuit holding in Watson v. Paterson.9 °
In that case, the denial of some expert assistance to an indigent was
held not to transgress constitutionally protected rights." Conversely,
the Ninth Circuit's Brubaker v. Dickson9 2 decision typifies a posi-
tion that "effective assistance" of counsel implies the necessity for fur-
ther defense services. 93  Brubaker, still using the fundamental fair-
ness test,94 concentrated on the question of "counsel's preparedness." '95
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits have taken a similar approach. 96 None
89. Compare Watson v. Patterson, 358 F.2d 297, 298 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 876 (1966), with Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30, 37 (9th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963).
90. 358 F.2d 297 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 876 (1966).
91. In Watson the court denied the defendant's request for two ballistic experts,
in addition to one already appointed, and a psychiatrist to explain the defendant's
motive for attempting to escape arrest. Watson v. People, 155 Colo. 357, 394 P.2d
737 (1964).
92. 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963).
93. This reasoning was based upon the expansion of the right to effective as-
sistance of counsel expounded in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see
notes 95 & 96 infra.
94. 310 F.2d at 37.
95. "FTlhe critical factual inquiry ... [is]: whether the defendant had a de-
fense which was not presented; whether trial counsel consulted sufficiently with the
accused, and adequately investigated the facts and the law; whether the omissions
charged to trial counsel resulted from inadequate preparation rather than from un-
wise choices of trial tactics and strategy." Id. at 32.
96. In Hintz v. Beto, 379 F.2d 937, 941 (5th Cir. 1967), the court said: "The
right to counsel afforded under the Sixth Amendment means the effective assistance
of counsel . . . . [E]ffective assistance of counsel in such a case may necessitate a
psychiatric examination of a defendant." In United States ex rel. Robinson v. Pate,
345 F.2d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 1965), remanded on other grounds, 383 U.S. 375 (1966),
the court said: "[T]he denial of a reasonable request to obtain the services of a
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of these decisions adequately examined the implications of Douglas v.
California and the equal protection aspects of the issue, and all of them
preceded Boddie v. Connecticut.
97
The new due process test, such as that set forth in Boddie, seem to
require that defense services be made available even if one refuses to
accept an argument based on equal protection. In Boddie the Su-
preme Court held violative of due process a divorce filing fee. If re-
quiring filing fees in divorce cases violates due process, 98 as a denial
of access to the court for indigents, surely the criminal defendant de-
serves at least equal consideration in overcoming the financial barrier
he encounters. Whether in the "search for intermediate premises," 99
increasing experience and evolving practice now make defense services
a due process right, or whether the test of fairness and standards of de-
cency have evolved to a new maturity, or whether it is simply said that
material disadvantage to one of the adversaries renders the proceed-
ings unfair, by any test, due process, like equal protection, must now
incorporate the right to defense services.
Conclusion
This article suggests that where the need is clear, the remedy
cannot be far behind. Whether the test of "equality with the prosecu-
tion" or the test of "equality with the rich defendant' is applied, equal
protection compels relief. This is so both because of the fundamental
character of the right to effective counsel 00 and because of the suspect
classification of indigency.101 Either of these factors requires a "com-
pelling state interest" and careful scrutiny before a court should deny
poor defendants their effective defense. As suggested above, no com-
pelling state interest is apparent which could justify denying poor de-
fendants their equality of access to justice.
necessary psychitaric witness is effectually a suppression of evidence violating the
fundamental right of due process." The court then went on to note the Gideon
expansion of due process: "In the wake of Gideon ... holding that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is embraced in the Fourteenth Amendment . . . it
follows that the right of compulsory process must similarly be included in the Four-
teenth Amendment protection .... In many cases unless a defendant had the op-
portunity to compel witnesses to appear in his behalf, the right to counsel would be
meaningless." Id. at 696-97.
97. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
98. Id.
99. Jaffe, Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search for Intermediate Premises,
80 H. v. L. Rnv. 986 (1967).
100. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
101. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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Under the due process test the same results will follow. In the
age of Boddie v. Connecticut, where due process was construed to pro-
hibit legislative denial of access to civil courts in divorce cases for those
unable to pay filing fees, access to services necessary for criminal de-
fense must be assured, a fortiori. If, under Gideon v. Wainwright, the
right to counsel is "absolute," the right to effective counsel, through
the use of defense services, must be at least "fundamental." This is
true whether one applies the due process test of Boddie v. Connecticut,
the test of Griffin v. Illinois with its due process and equal protection
combination, the purely equal protection test of Douglas v. California,
or the analogy in the Williams v. Florida"0 Sixth Amendment in-
quiry into "the function that the particular feature [defense services]
performs and its relation to the purposes of the [right to effective coun-
sel.]" 1°3 Whatever the changes in theory or personnel of the Supreme
Court, we can conceive of no theory, now viable, under which a care-
fully documented need for services required for an indigent's defense
should be rejected.
102. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
103. Id. at 99-100.
[Vol. 24
